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Abstract 
Financial liberalizations in recent decades have prepared the way for the rapidly 
increasing number of studies related to the investigations of foreign exchange market 
efficiency in developing economies via testing for the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition. Chapter 1 provides a survey on this recent literature. Specifically, it attempts to 
answer the following question: are the economies of developing countries different from 
those of developed countries in the context of the UIP condition? 
Examining cross-country data, Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) found that the puzzling 
correlation between the exchange rate changes and the interest rate differentials of two 
countries appears less puzzling among developing countries than among developed countries. 
Several economists come up with new types of theoretical models that can explain the above 
new findings [e.g. Alvarez and Atkeson (2005), Baccheta and Wincoop (2005, 2009)]. 
According to these models, when inflation is low, the exchange rate adjustment tends to be 
slow because adjustment is costly. This is why we observe the UIP puzzle in many developed 
countries where inflation rates are low. In Chapter 2, we cast doubt on these claims of the 
models by empirically examining the cross-country data. In essence, we argue that these 
models appear to solve the “nominal puzzle” but cannot solve the “real puzzle” of the UIP 
relation. After taking account of the relative PPP effect, we observe the same degree of the 
real UIP puzzle in both groups of countries. 
The increasing international equity flows relative to bank loans or bonds constitutes a 
motivation to investigate a relationship of equity returns and exchange rate change. Under no-
arbitrage condition, the expected returns on home equity market should equal those on the 
foreign equity market. This relation is known as the Uncovered Equity Party (UEP). In 
iv 
 
Chapter 3, we propose an alternative method, called the UEP Ratio and UIP Ratio, to test the 
UEP relation and UIP relation, respectively. Examining time-series data for ten countries 
with developed financial markets, we find that UIP is less puzzling than we thought. 
Furthermore, unlike the literature, we find that UIP holds better than UEP. In addition, the 
UEP regression is a biased predictor of the deviation in UEP. 
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Chapter 1 
What Have We Learned about the Uncovered Interest? 
1.1 Introduction 
The uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition is a no-arbitrage condition between 
investing in an asset denominated in domestic currency and an asset denominated in foreign 
currency such that the expected return from a foreign asset is equal to the return from a 
domestic asset as follows: 
            
  
        
  
   
                       (1.1) 
  
   is the home currency price of the foreign currency.    and   
  denote asset interest rates 
denominated in domestic and foreign currency, respectively. 
Log approximation of equation (1.1) yields 
                  
 ,         (1.2) 
where      ,          .        
In other worlds, according to UIP, a speculator is indifferent between interest bearing 
identical assets denominated in different currency. UIP predicts that a high interest currency 
tends to depreciate against a low interest rate currency. The conventional way to test for the 
existence of UIP is to regress the exchange rate change on interest rate differential relative to 
a reference currency as follows: 
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                                 (1.3) 
  
where      is an error term, and testing the joint hypothesis of      and       
Assuming the covered interest parity (CIP) condition
1
, the UIP condition can also be 
estimated by regressing the exchange rate change on the forward premium as follows: 
                            ,          (1.4) 
where    is the forward rate. 
Alternatively, UIP can be described in terms of excess returns from a carry trade. 
Consider the carry trade strategy in which investors borrow from a low interest rate currency 
and lend it in high interest rate currency; the excess return of this strategy can be defined by 
              
                  (1.5) 
If UIP holds, payoff from a positive interest rate differential will be offset by the 
depreciation of the high interest rate currency such that excess returns should be zero. That is, 
                                    (1.6) 
1.2 UIP and Developing Countries 
The wide-ranging survey performed by Engel (1996) not only rejects UIP hypothesis but 
also states that its prediction is of the opposite direction. That is, a high interest rate currency 
                                                 
1
 The log approximation of CIP condition:           
 . Burnside et al. (2006) use the interbank interest rates 
for ten countries to test the implication of CIP, finding that the relation does hold. 
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tends to appreciate against a low interest rate currency. This is known as the UIP puzzle or 
forward premium puzzle.  
Economists have not yet come to agreement on what the clear explanations are for the 
UIP puzzle. As an example, researchers such as Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) assert that 
aggregate consumption growth in the United States is central to understanding the UIP 
condition. Specifically, their work shows that high interest rate currencies usually decrease in 
value when US consumption growth is low, and US investors expect to be compensated for 
this risk. Conversely, Burnside (2007) disagrees with Lustig’s and Verdelhan’s study and 
uses the data from the same study, with a different specification of econometric model, to 
show that a model based solely on US consumption growth is not sufficient to explain the 
currency risk premium. 
In addition, Burnside et al. (2008) studied an unbalanced panel of 20 major currencies 
with monthly data spans from 1976 to 2007 using U.S. dollar as a funding currency. For most 
of these currencies, the estimated slope coefficient is significantly negative, suggesting 
excess return from borrowing in low interest rate currencies and lending in high interest rate 
ones. Their study shows that excess return is significantly different from zero, but not 
statistically correlated with all single and groups of risk factors. Finally, they assert that 
sufficient evidence has not been found to support the idea that a “peso problem”, or other rare 
disaster, can be used to explain the UIP puzzle. 
Attempting to explain the UIP puzzle, Brunnermeir, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) released 
a study consisting of a panel of nine major currencies from 1986 to 2006 that indicates that 
currencies with high interest rates have high negatively skewed excess returns which can be 
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interpreted as “crash risk.” This risk could limit arbitrage in currency speculation causing 
deviations from UIP. 
Most studies focus on the existence of UIP in major currencies in developed countries. 
However, there are a number of recent empirical studies that analyze UIP in both developed 
economies and emerging markets. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) show a difference between 
developed and emerging economies by using a panel of weekly data spanning from 1976 to 
1998 to test an implication of UIP for twenty-eight advanced and emerging economies. Their 
results indicate that the UIP puzzle only exists in developed economies when the U.S. interest 
rate is higher than the interest rate of other developed countries. However, the puzzle does 
not seem to exist, and the estimate of the slope coefficient of equation (1.6) increases toward 
unity in emerging economies. 
Conversely, Flood and Rose (2002) perform a study composed of thirteen developed 
economies and ten emerging markets using an unbalanced panel of daily data starting in the 
early 1990s and thus omitted the pre-1990 period in Bansal and Dahlquist (2000). This is 
notable since emerging markets around the world had only started reforming their financial 
accounts towards the end of the 1980s and the start of the 1990s. Because the study focused 
solely on post-1990 data, it excluded the effects of the aggregate shocks seen in the late 
1970s and 1980s on the developed economies from the analysis of the UIP condition. Flood 
and Rose (2002) show that the deviation from UIP is less in their data sets than it is in older-
period data. The slope coefficient estimates of UIP regression are positive, but the results 
indicate no significant differences between developed and emerging economies. 
Frankel and Poonawala (2006) used data from December 1996 to April 2004 to analyze 
the forward premium puzzle in twenty-one developed countries and fourteen emerging 
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markets. Their results from an individual country and pooled analysis indicate that the UIP 
puzzle is present in developed countries. However, in emerging economies, the slope 
coefficient estimates are slightly positive on average. Frankel and Poonawala (2006) suggest 
that the exchange rate risk premium may not explain the UIP puzzle as emerging markets are 
perceived to have high risk, but deviate less from UIP. 
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007) studied a panel of sixty three countries ( both 
developed and emerging economies) spanning the period of 1997 – 2006. According to their 
specified currency trading rules in which speculators never invest in twelve currencies and 
take less than ten trades in an additional twelve currencies in their dataset. They show that the 
Shape ratio increases when emerging market currencies are included, and excess returns from 
their trading strategy are not correlated with the U.S. stock market returns, suggesting that the 
risk premium cannot explain excess returns. 
In short, most studies find that the puzzling correlation between the exchange rate 
changes and the interest rate differentials of two countries appears less puzzling among 
developing countries than among the developed countries. Why developing and developed 
countries are so different in terms of UIP is investigated in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 
Real and Nominal Puzzles of the Uncovered Interest Parity 
2.1 Introduction 
It has long been known that the uncovered interest parity (UIP) relation rarely holds 
empirically.
2
 The UIP slope coefficient is often not only less than unity but also negative. In 
other words, the future exchange rate change is not just far from what is predicted from the 
current nominal interest rate differential between two countries. But predicting in the 
opposite direction from the UIP is often better than otherwise. This disastrous empirical 
failure of the most fundamental theoretical relation in international finance prompts many 
papers which claim to have found either new theoretical models able to explain the apparent 
inconsistencies, or new empirical procedures able to find what is consistent with the 
conventional theory
3
. 
One of the most interesting empirical findings in the literature which attracts a great deal 
of attention recently is Bansal and Dahlquist (2000). Examining cross-country data, they 
found that the puzzling correlation between the exchange rate change and the interest rate 
differentials of two countries appears less puzzling among developing countries than among 
                                                 
2
 Engle (1996) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature. 
3
 Fama (1984) shows that, to cause the exchange rate anomaly, the risk premium must be more volatile than and 
negatively correlated with the exchange rate change. Since then, there are many attempts to explain the 
“forward premium puzzle” by a risk premium. Among others, Engel and Frankel (1984), Engle and Rodrigues 
(1989) and Mark (1988) use the international CAMP approach that generates a risk premium. Lustig and 
Verdelhan (2007) assert that aggregate consumption growth in the U.S. is central to understanding the UIP 
condition. Other explanations include the “peso problem”. Evans and Lewis (1995) show that the “peso 
problem” may have an effect on an inference of the risk premium. Unfortunately, none of those attempts can 
yet solve the puzzle successfully. Burnside et al. (2008) show that the risk premium is not correlated with any 
risk factor, and there is not enough evidence to support the “peso problem”, or other rare disaster, being used 
to explain the UIP puzzle. 
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the developed countries.
4
 They argue that the presence of the forward premium is attributed 
to each country specifics, especially, average inflation and expected inflation which are 
considered as evidence of segmented markets.  
Several economists come up with a new theoretical models that can explain the above 
new findings [e.g. Alvarez and Atkeson (2005), Baccheta and Wincoop (2005, 2009)]. 
According to these models, when inflation is low, the exchange rate adjustment tends to be 
slow because adjustment is costly. This is why we observe the UIP puzzle in many developed 
countries where inflation rates are low.
 5
 
The purpose of this paper is not to solve the puzzle; however, we cast doubt in these 
claims of the models by empirically examining the cross-country data. In essence, we argue 
that these models appear to solve the “nominal puzzle” but cannot solve the “real puzzle” of 
the UIP relation. After taking account of the relative PPP effect, we observe the same degree 
of the real UIP puzzle in both groups of countries. It appears that the exchange rate change in 
the high-inflation group is a result of the relative PPP relation rather than the UIP relation. 
                                                 
4
 In particular, they found the coefficient of the UIP regression is slightly positive in developing countries. It is 
not that the UIP holds in developing countries, but that the puzzle is not as extreme as in the developed 
countries. More specifically, they found coefficients of the UIP regression are -0.32 and 0.19 in developed and 
developing countries, respectively. In addition, Frankel and Poonawala (2006) found coefficients of the UIP 
regression are -1.67 and 0.15 for emerging market and advanced economies, respectively. 
5
 To explain a deviation from UIP, Alvarez and Atkeson (2005) attributed the failure of UIP to time-varying risk 
premia occurred in segmented asset markets in which investors have limited participation due to fixed costs. 
When inflation is low, the markets are segmented. But when inflation is high, most investors choose to pay the 
fixed costs, so that the markets are less segmented leading to constant risk premia, thus less deviation from 
UIP. Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) argued that a deviation from UIP can be explained by expectation errors 
about future exchange rates. They claim that the inattentiveness of investors in portfolio decisions is the cause 
of these errors. Bacchetta and Wincoop (2009) attributed the deviation from UIP to infrequent revisions of 
portfolios due to fixed costs. Their model predicts that persistent high inflation will raise the depreciation rate 
and interest rate differentials by the same amount causing high coefficient in UIP regression.  
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Comparing the cross section plots of excess returns against inflation differentials of the 
low and high-inflation periods, Gilmore and Hayashi (2008) find that the estimated UIP slope 
coefficient is large for developing countries because of their high inflation. In this paper, we 
introduce the decomposed and augmented UIP regressions to numerically decompose the UIP 
and relative PPP effects on the exchange rate change. We also compare the “real UIP” 
relation between low and high-inflation countries. 
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we develop the 
distinction between nominal and real UIP puzzles, and formulate a way to examine each 
component. In section 2.3, we report our empirical findings. A brief conclusion is given in 
section 2.4. 
2.2 Nominal and Real Puzzles 
To entangle the puzzles underlying the UIP relation, we consider the following empirical 
framework. We introduce five simple regressions, discuss their relationship, and then 
distinguish the real puzzle from the nominal puzzle of the UIP.  
First, we express the UIP relation in a log approximation form as 
                            
 ,       (2.1)  
where      ,   is a lag operator,          , and    is the home currency price of the 
foreign currency. Conventionally, the UIP relation is tested by running the UIP regression, 
                   
        ,      (2.2) 
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and examine the size of the coefficient  . In this context, we say that the UIP puzzle exists if 
the null hypothesis that     is rejected by data. We also say the “extreme version of the 
UIP puzzle” exists if   is significantly negative. 
It is important to emphasize that empirically, the exchange rate change can be predicted 
by not only the interest rate differential via the UIP relation but also the inflation differential 
via the relative PPP relation. Relative PPP is the equilibrium in the goods market. Therefore, 
it is crucial to distinguish whether the exchange rate change is due to the asset market (UIP 
relation) or goods market (relative PPP relation).  
There exists a reason to believe that the real interest rate is different across countries. For 
example, different countries have different production functions and, so, the marginal product 
of capital. Under the assumption that the real interest rate is not the same for all countries, the 
real interest rate differential affects the expected exchange rate change via the UIP channel. 
Also, the expected exchange rate change can be predicted by the expected inflation 
differential via the relative PPP channel. 
Consider the relative purchasing power parity (PPP) relation, we consider the relative 
PPP in the form as 
      
             
 ,        (2.3) 
where      
      
     ,     
  is the long-run equilibrium value of the exchange rate at 
   ,    is the home inflation rate, and   
  is the foreign inflation rate. The actual exchange 
rate at     can then be thought of as the partial adjustment outcome between the current 
rate    and the equilibrium rate     
  
10 
 
            
          ,        (2.4) 
where   measures the adjustment speed (     ). Taking the conditional expectation of 
(4) given the information up to time   and using (3) yields 
                  
            
                                     
              
which implies 
                 
       
   , 
where     
           and     
          
  . This relation can be written as 
             
       
       ,       (2.5) 
where                    . We call (2.5) the “relative PPP regression.”  
We use the Fisher equation to write the nominal interest differential as 
       
         
         
       
   , 
where            
  and   
    
       
   are the real interest rates in the home and foreign 
countries, respectively. Substituting this relationship into (2.1), we rewrite the UIP relation as 
                  
         
       
   ,     (2.6) 
and the UIP regression as 
              
        
      
      
       
          .   (2.7) 
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In regression (2.7), exchange rate change correlates with real interest rate differential and 
expected inflation differential.6 Note: if   
     
 , regression (2.7) reduces to the original 
equation in the sense that the regression (2.2) is simply a restricted version of regression (2.7) 
with constraint   
     
 . An advantage of using regression (2.7) is that we could find 
whether deviation from the UIP relation comes from the real part or expected inflation part. 
The source of deviation of the original UIP regression is depending on either   
  or   
  
deviation from unity.  So, we reparameterize the regression (2.7) as 
                     
           
       
          .   (2.8) 
In regression (2.8), exchange rate change correlates with the nominal interest rate 
differential and expected inflation differential. Since the original UIP regression is augmented 
by the expected inflation differential, we call regression (2.8) the augmented UIP regression. 
Regression (2.8) is simply reparameterization of (2.7) in the sense that the space spanned by        
       
   and      
       
    is the same as the space spanned by        
   and      
  
     
   . In other words, regressions (2.7) and (2.8) are identical with reparameterization 
     
  and      
    
 . 
In regression (2.8), if     , regression (2.5) reduces to the original UIP regression 
(2.2). On the other hand, if     , regression (2.8) becomes regression (2.5), or in other 
words, the augmented UIP regression reduces to the relative PPP regression. 
To derive the real UIP relation, we applied the Fisher equation and considered the UIP 
regression in real terms. So we subtract      
       
    from both sides of the UIP equation 
(2.1) to obtain 
                                                 
6
   
  and   
   are unobservable. We discuss in the next section how to estimate them. 
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         (2.9) 
where              
    
 
  
  is the real exchange rate7. (2.9) defines the real UIP relation. 
Based on this relation, we specify the real version of regression (2.2) as  
                   
              (2.10) 
We call (2.10) the real UIP regression. We say that the real UIP puzzle exists if the null 
hypothesis that     is rejected by data, and that the “extreme version of the real UIP 
puzzle” exists if   is significantly negative. 
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) found that correlation   is not necessary negative in the 
original UIP regression for developing countries although it is mostly negative in developed 
countries. In other words, the extreme version of the UIP puzzle does not exist in developing 
countries. In the next section, we try to discover the main sources for making the deviations 
from the UIP so different between the developed country group and the emerging market 
country group by comparing the empirical results of the five regressions. 
So far, we have developed 5 regressions: (2.2), (2.5), (2.7), (2.8), and (2.10). In the next 
section, we used these regressions to find out nature of the UIP puzzle more closely. 
                                                 
7
 (2.9) can be obtained by noticing       =     
        
 
    
      
    
 
  
  =     
    
  
      
     
  
      
    
 
  
   = 
                 
  .  
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2.3 Empirical Results 
2.3.1 Data 
The data we use in our empirical investigation are quarterly data on exchange rates, 
interest rates, inflation rates, unemployment rates, and real GDP in 42 countries over the first 
quarter of 1994 through the first quarter of 2009. The exchange rate in each country is the 
price of each currency in terms of US dollars. The interest rate is the 3-month interbank 
interest rate in the London market. The inflation rate is based on the CPI.
8
 
Since real interest rates and real exchange rates are unobservable, it is necessary to obtain 
expected inflation rates. There are two ways: surveys and forecasting model. To estimate the 
expected inflation, we calculate a one-step-ahead (out of sample) inflation forecast at each 
quarter for each country based on the forecasting model suggest by Stock and Watson (1999). 
More specifically, we first fit the Phillips curve model 
               
 
              
 
      ,      (2.11) 
                                                 
8
 The data on daily spot exchange rates are from the Datastream of the WM Company/Reuters, except the euro, 
which is from Barclay’s Bank International. The interbank Eurocurrency interest rates data are from the 
Datastream for the middle rates and from the British Bankers’ Association for the offered rates; the U.S. 
interbank daily middle and offered rates are used as a reference to calculate interest rate differentials. Due to 
the lack of availability of data on the interbank Eurocurrency interest rates, the domestic interbank interest 
rates from the Datastream and the Global Financial Data are used for some countries. All CPI and GDP data 
are from the IMF. The data on unemployment rates are from the IMF and OECD. Data sources for each 
country are shown in Table A1. The daily data is converted into quarterly data using the first working day for 
each quarter with the U.S. as the home country. We exclude Argentina in 2002Q2 and 2002Q4, Russia in 
1998Q4, Romania in 1999Q2 and Turkey in 2003Q2 from our sample because the irregularity in the data. 
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where      stands for the lagged unemployment rate. The lag length   and   are determined 
according to the Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion. Then we estimate     
  by 
calculating the one-quarter-ahead forecast based on the estimated coefficients in each step.
9
 
The inflation expectation calculated above is not necessary a public expectation of 
inflation. However, public expectation is based on information provided by specialists who 
use econometric models. Therefore, public expectation is roughly approximated by the best 
perform forecasting model. Stock and Watson did experiment on many models, and found 
that (2.11) is the best econometric model to forecast inflation.  
2.3.2 Empirical Results 
Examining cross-country data, Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) found that the negative slope 
of the UIP regression is not universally observed but mainly occurs in developed countries. 
Rather than classify these countries into developed and developing economies [as Bansal and 
Dahlquist (2000) did], we instead classify them into high inflation and low inflation 
countries. Surprisingly, our classification still yields similar groupings of countries as did 
Bansal and Dahlquist’s developed/developing classification (2000). In fact, the groupings of 
the two classifications are virtually identical, with high inflation overlapping with developing 
countries and low inflation overlapping with developed countries. More specifically, in our 
classification, we call a country with an average annual inflation rate of less than 3.2% a low 
inflation country. We call a country with an average annual inflation rate of more than 3.2% a 
high inflation country. Due to our alternative classification, all developed countries in our 
                                                 
9
 For simplicity, we set the lag length    . We use a change in real GDP in place of unemployment rate for 
Argentina, Denmark, Netherlands, South Africa and Thailand because the latter data are not available. We use 
only lagged inflation for Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Romania, Russia and 
Singapore since neither unemployment nor GDP are available. 
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sample have an average inflation rate that is less than 3.2%. All developing and emerging 
economy countries in our sample have an average inflation rate higher than 3.2%. Exceptions 
are Hong Kong and Singapore, which we classify into developed countries. 
To provide the ground for comparing the real and nominal UIP regressions, we 
investigate the variations of real and nominal exchange rate changes. Table 2.1 displays the 
unconditional variance of changes in nominal exchange rates, real exchange rates, and ex-
post inflation differentials for low and high inflation countries. We find that the variation in 
nominal exchange rate changes largely comes from the variation in real exchange rate 
changes. Therefore, the variations to be explained in the real and nominal UIP regressions are 
not different. 
Table 2.1: Volatilities Statistics 
 V(∆st+1) V(∆qt+1)            
 ) 
        
        
 
           
  
        
 
Low Inflation Countries 0.00237 0.00230 0.00005 0.97046 0.02109 
High Inflation Countries 0.00482 0.00407 0.00089 0.84440 0.18463 
Notes: V(·) stands for the unconditional variance. 
 
Figure 2.1A presents the plots of the pairs of the exchange rate change and interest rate 
differential for all countries. The regression line appears to have a slightly positive slope. 
Figures 2.1B and 2.1C show the same plots for the groups of low and high inflation countries 
separately. They illustrate that the regression lines for two groups are strikingly different. The 
low inflation group exhibits negative slope, while the high inflation group shows positive 
slope.  
16 
 
 
A. All Countries 
 
 
B. Low Inflation Countries 
 
 
C. High Inflation Countries 
  
 
Figure 2.1: Exchange Rate Changes and Interest Rate Differentials 
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This contrast can be seen more clearly in Table 2.2. The first two columns of the table 
report the estimates of the slope coefficient in regression model (2.3) for low and high 
inflation countries groups. The estimated coefficient is significantly negative for the low 
inflation countries group. It is this observation where we usually find the extreme version of 
the UIP puzzle. The coefficient for the high inflation group, on the other hand, is estimated to 
be significantly positive but still far from satisfying the UIP relation (see Table 2.2B). It 
would be rather incorrect to say that the UIP puzzle is absent in high inflation countries. The 
point has been known since Bansal and Dahlquist (2000). 
Table 2.2: Nominal UIP Regressions 
  Low Inflation High Inflation Low Inflation High Inflation 
 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Fixed Effects Regression     
     
  -1.523** 0.388* -1.519** -0.077 
  (0.275) (0.147) (0.447) (0.185) 
     
    
       
     -0.024 0.721** 
    (0.363) (0.207) 
   0.018 0.021 0.018 0.058 
N 855 846 855 855 
     
B. Hypothesis Testing     
Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value   
     9.17** 0.000   
     4.18** 0.001   
      6.13** 0.000   
        2.98** 0.001   
Notes: 1. Nominal UIP is given in regression (2.2):                     
        ;  the augmented UIP 
is given in regression (2.8):                      
            
       
          , where i =   for 
low inflation countries and i =  for high inflation countries. 
2. The hypothesis testing is performed using the two-tailed test. 
3. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for regression (2.2) and are bootstrapped standard 
errors to account for the generated regrssor in regression (2.8). * indicates significance at 5-percent 
level. ** indicates significance at 1-percent level. 
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Figure 2.2 further illuminates the relation between the UIP regression coefficient for each 
country (vertical axis) and the average inflation rate (horizontal axis). The vertical line of the 
average inflation rate = 3.2 is the inflation cutoff line where the plots on the left of the line is 
considered for low inflation countries and the plots on the right of the line is considered for 
high inflation countries. It is constructed by first running the UIP regression country by 
country to obtain the estimate of the slope coefficient. Then, we plot the estimated coefficient 
against the average inflation for each country. It reveals a striking contrast. Among low 
inflation group, the negative slope dominates. Twenty countries out of twenty two members 
in this group have the slope coefficients estimated negatively. In contrast, the signs of the 
slope estimates are divided almost evenly among the countries in high inflation group; 
positive in eleven countries and negative in nine countries. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The Nominal UIP Regression Coefficients and Average Inflation Rate 
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The above observation motivates us to investigate further the UIP relation and the 
expected inflation differential. We run two additional regressions. First, the expected inflation 
differential is included to the UIP relation, and the augmented UIP regression (2.8) is run. 
Second, we drop the interest differential from the regression (2.8) and run the relative PPP 
regression (2.5). 
The third and fourth columns of Table 2.2 report the result of the augmented UIP 
regression
10
. We find a striking difference again between the two groups of countries. In the 
low inflation group, the interest differential has a significant negative impact, but the 
expected inflation differential is insignificant. The opposite is true for the high inflation 
group; the impact of the expected inflation differential overwhelms that of the interest 
differential, and the latter is insignificant. We have an impression now that the source of the 
highly significant positive estimate (for the high inflation group in the original UIP 
regression) appears to be expected inflation differential rather than interest differential itself. 
In contrast, there is little change in the estimated coefficient on the nominal rate of 
differential between the original UIP regression and the augmented regression equation (2.8) 
(Columns 1 and 3). 
Table 2.3 reports the result of the relative PPP regression (2.5). Dropping the interest 
differential as a regressor turns out to have a critical impact on the coefficient on the inflation 
differential in the low inflation group but almost no impact in the high inflation group. In other 
words, if the expected inflation differential is included in the UIP relation, the augmented UIP 
                                                 
10
 Engle (2011) calculates the ex-ante real interest rate differential using the predicted inflation from VAR. He 
corrects the standard error to account for the generated regressor in the real UIP regression using the bootstrap 
method for 1,000 repetitions. We follow his technique to account for generated regressors in our models. 
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regression effectively reduces to the relative PPP regression. Results in table 2.3 suggest that 
the exchange rate change in the high-inflation group is a result of the relative PPP relation. 
Table 2.3: Relative PPP Regressions 
  Low Inflation High Inflation 
 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
    
       
    -0.192 0.668** 
  (0.368) (0.164) 
    0.000 0.058 
N  855 846 
Notes: 1. Relative PPP is given in regression (2.5). 
2. Numbers in parentheses are Bootstrapped standard errors. * indicates significance at 5-percent level. 
** indicates significance at 1-percent level. 
 
Since we discover that the variations to be explained in the real and nominal UIP 
regressions are not different as shown in Table 2.1, we can step further to the real UIP 
regression where the real-exchange rate change is regressed on the real interest rate 
differential. The real UIP regression accounts for inflation differential between a country pair. 
Table 2.4 reports the results. The slope coefficients for both low and high inflation countries 
are different from unity. This is the “real puzzle” of the UIP relationship. We also find the 
slope coefficient for low and high inflation countries are not significantly different from each 
other (Table 2.4B). Unlike in the nominal UIP regression, the two groups of countries behave 
similarly in the context of real UIP. 
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Table 2.4: Real UIP Regressions 
Notes: 1. Real UIP regression is given in regression (2.10):                     
        ,  i =   for 
low inflation countries and i =  for high inflation countries. 
2. The hypothesis testing is performed using the two-tailed test. 
3. Numbers in parentheses are Bootstrapped standard errors to account for the generated regressors. ** 
indicates significance at 1-percent level 
 
Figure 2.3 displays the relation between the UIP regression coefficient and the average 
inflation in the nominal and real terms. Now little difference in the real UIP regression 
coefficient between the two inflation groups appears. However, in both groups the 
coefficients are still different from the theoretical parity value of unity. 
To illustrate the effects of UIP and relative PPP on exchange rate change, Figure 2.4 
displays the plots of the points of exchange rate change, interest rate differential, and 
expected inflation differential in three-dimensional graphs. For low inflation countries, the 
covariance of exchange rate change and interest rate differential is higher than the covariance 
  Low Inflation High Inflation 
 ∆qt+1 ∆qt+1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
A. Fixed Effects Regression    
     
   0.172 0.082 
  (0.287) (0.169) 
    
    0.001 0.001 
N  855 846 
    
B. Hypothesis Testing    
Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value  
     2.89** 0.004  
     5.43** 0.000  
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of exchange rate change and expected inflation differential; the opposite is true for high 
inflation countries. These graphs correspond to the results from the regressions above. 
 
 
Notes: 1. Average inflation rates are calculated from quarterly data and then 
annualized. 
 2. Coefficient   is given in regression (2.3) and shown in black. 
 3. Coefficient   is given in regression (2.12) and shown in white. 
4. Country ID is next to each point in figure A above. See Table A 2.1 
to determine the identity of each country. 
 
Figure 2.3: The Nominal vs. Real UIP Regression Coefficients and Average Inflation Rate 
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A. Low Inflation Countries 
 
 
B. High Inflation Countries 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Exchange Rate Changes, Interest Rate Differentials and Expected Inflation 
Differentials 
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2.3.3 Robustness Check 
First, we check the robustness to the subsample period starting in 1997Q3, which is the 
beginning period used by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2007). In the subsample period, 
rather classified countries into developing and developed groups, we define a low inflation 
country as one with its average annual inflation rate lower than 2.8%. Countries having 
average annual inflation rate higher than 2.8% are classified into high inflation countries. The 
above two classifications are almost overlapped. Specifically, all developed countries in our 
subsample have the average inflation rates less than 2.8%. All developing and emerging 
economy countries in our sample have the average inflation rate higher than 2.8%. 
Exceptions are Hong Kong and Singapore. Tables A2.2, A2.3, and A2.4 show the regression 
results of the subsample starting 1997Q3. The results from the subsample period are similar 
to those of the full-sample period.  
Second, we check the robustness to low-high inflation classification criteria. We define 
extreme inflation cutoffs as follows. All countries having average inflation higher than the 3
rd
 
Quartile are classified into high-inflation-countries. All countries having average inflation 
less than the 1
rd
 Quartile are classified into low-inflation-countries. Tables A2.5, A2.6, and 
A2.7 present the regression results using the extreme inflation cutoffs. The results using the 
extreme inflation cutoffs are similar to those of the original regressions. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) found the coefficient of the UIP regression is slightly 
positive in developing countries. That is, UIP puzzle is not as extreme as in the developed 
countries. They argue that the presence of the forward premium is attributed to each country 
specifics, especially, average inflation and expected inflation which are considered as 
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evidence of segmented markets. Using more recent data, Gilmore and Hayashi (2008) 
confirmed the findings that the puzzle is less prevalent for emerging market currencies than 
for major currencies. 
A number of studies propose theoretical models with segmented markets to explain the 
difference between developed and developing countries in the context of UIP. According to 
these models, when inflation is low, the exchange rate adjustment tends to be slow because 
adjustment is costly. This is why we observe the UIP puzzle in many developed countries 
where inflation rates are low 
In order to investigate the effect of inflation, rather than classify countries into developed 
and developing economies, we instead classify them into high inflation and low inflation 
countries. However, our classification still yields similar groupings of countries as did Bansal 
and Dahlquist’s developed/developing classification (2000) with high inflation overlapping 
with developing countries and low inflation overlapping with developed countries.  
We find that the “nominal puzzle” is less extreme in high inflation countries than in low 
inflation countries. However, after taking account of the relative PPP effect, we observe the 
same degree of the real UIP puzzle in both groups of countries. Our empirical investigation 
suggests that the exchange rate change in the high-inflation group is a result of the relative 
PPP relation rather than the UIP relation. It appears that the inflation plays a role of a noise 
rather than a key to unlock the puzzle underlying the UIP relation. If it is the case, we need to 
focus our investigation on the real relation between the exchange rate changes and the interest 
rate differentials. 
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Chapter 3 
Uncovered Equity Parity: Is It Another Puzzle? 
3.1 Introduction 
With increases in financial globalization, investors hold foreign risk-free assets or bonds 
as well as risky-assets such as equities. In the early 1990s, the international equity flows for 
the U.S. have grown substantially relative to bank loans or government bonds.
11
 There is a 
fundamental theory in international finance based on a no-arbitrage condition in which the 
interest rate differential between two countries is equal to the expected change in exchange 
rate, known as the uncovered interest parity (UIP) relation. However, it has long been known 
that the UIP relation rarely holds empirically.
12
  
The increasing portion of international equity flows and the notorious empirical failure of 
UIP are motivations to explore an alternative no-arbitrage condition in which, instead of the 
interest rate differential, the expected equity return differential between two countries is equal 
to the expected change in exchange rate, called the “uncovered equity parity” (UEP) 
condition. UEP states that when expected foreign equity return is higher than the expected 
U.S. equity return, rational and risk-neutral U.S. investors should expect the foreign currency 
to depreciate against the dollar by the difference between the two expected returns. In the 
literature, UEP is largely supported by data in the sense that the equity return differential 
predicts exchange rate movement in the right direction. This suggests that UEP holds better 
than UIP. 
                                                 
11
 See Hau and Rey (2006). 
12
 Engle (1996) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature. 
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One of the first theoretical and empirical findings in the literature is by Hau and Rey 
(2006). They develop a model where exchange rates, equity market returns and capital flows 
are jointly determined. When foreign equity markets outperform domestic equity markets, the 
relative exposure of domestic investors to exchange rate risk increases. To diminish foreign 
exchange exposure, the home investor can then rebalance his portfolio decreasing his foreign 
positions. This will generate capital outflows from the foreign to the domestic country. The 
foreign capital outflows generated by the risk rebalancing channel will lead to an excess 
demand for the domestic currency and hence its appreciation. Examining time-series data 
including ex-post equity returns for seventeen OECD countries, Hau and Rey found support 
for the model. 
Cappiello and De Santis (2005), by employing the Lucas (1982) consumption economy 
model, propose the UEP relation which is an arbitrage relationship between expected 
exchange rate changes and expected equity returns differentials of two economies. 
Specifically, if expected returns on a home equity market are higher than those on foreign 
markets, investors in the home market suffer a loss when investing abroad. Therefore, they 
have to be compensated by the expected gain from the foreign currency appreciation. This 
ensures that arbitrage opportunities do not exist. Using ex-post equity returns for seven 
developed markets relative to the US market, the found UEP explains a large portion of 
exchange rate change for some European currencies against the U.S. dollar. 
Unlike Hau and Rey’s theoretical setup, Cappiello and De Santis (2007) proposed a much 
simpler model of UEP by extending UIP to risky assets. Using ex-ante equity returns for 
three European markets relative to the US market, they found that their model was supported 
by the data for some markets over some periods of time. 
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Kim (2011) attempts to explain the failure of UEP by extending the UEP model to 
include the market risk adjustment. He uses the ex-post equity returns data of four Asian 
emerging markets relative to the U.S., Japan and U.K. He finds evidence to support the 
hypothesis that there exists market risk in the Asian emerging markets and concludes that the 
market risk could explain the failure of UEP for those countries. Recently, Curcuru et al. 
(2014), using ex-post data, investigate the relationship between U.S. investor’s portfolio 
reallocations and returns from investing in forty two foreign countries. They conclude that 
there exists some evidence supporting UEP. 
However, we find problems with testing the UEP relation in the literature, as well as the 
UIP relation. First, testing the UIP or UEP relation using the UIP or UEP regression tells only 
whether the relations hold or not. When the relations do not hold, the testing does not 
intuitively give the magnitude of the deviation of the relation. In addition, the UEP relation 
should be hold ex-ante not ex-post because economic agents make their probability 
assessments based on the information available to them at the time. However, the expected 
equity returns are not known ex ante. If ex-post data are used in the UEP regression, the 
regression is not valid. 
We propose solutions to the above problems as follows. Since the expectation and 
economic system (data generating process) are not known, we assume that the data are 
generated according to the ad hoc VAR model. Then we calculate the expected domestic 
equity return and expected foreign equity return directly and make a comparison. This VAR 
assumption is necessary because of some benefits. One of the benefits is that ex-ante 
expectation can be calculated using the underlying distribution. In addition, in the VAR 
model, each variable is predicted by using the past values of all variables making it a simple 
exercise. Also, since all time periods are used to calculate the parameters in the VAR, 
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economic agents know the model and data generating process. So when they make a 
prediction, they can do it correctly making this a controlled exercise free of prediction errors.  
In this paper, we find evidence contrasting most studies in the literature. We show that 
UIP is less puzzling than UEP. Furthermore, we discover that the UEP regression, used 
largely in the literature, is a biased predictor of the deviation in UEP. In the next section, we 
propose the simulation method for testing the UIP and UEP relations. In section 3.3, we 
report our results. A brief conclusion is given in section 3.4. 
3.2 Model and Estimation 
3.2.1 The Uncovered Equity Parity (UEP) condition 
Under a no-arbitrage condition, if an investor is risk-neutral, expected domestic equity 
returns should equal expected foreign equity returns when expressed in common currency. 
Specifically, when foreign expected equity returns are higher than home expected equity 
returns, home investors short sell their equity in the home market for one dollar and go long 
in the foreign equity market by converting that one dollar to foreign currency of 
 
  
 to buy 
foreign equity. After one period, the returns on foreign market will be 
 
  
         
   or 
 
  
          
        when expressed in home currency. Instead, if that one dollar is invested 
in the home equity market, the returns after one period will be           . To ensure no 
certain opportunities for profit, the returns from the home and foreign markets should be 
equal as follows: 
            
 
  
          
       ,     (3.1) 
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where    is a domestic equity return    
  is a foreign equity return and    is the home currency 
price of the foreign currency. 
Hau and Rey (2006), and Cappiello and De Santis (2005), among others, test the UEP 
relation in a way similar to testing the UIP relation. Equity return differential is used instead 
of interest rate differential giving the UEP regression as follows: 
                         
        .     (3.2) 
where      ,          . 
They find that, unlike the UIP regression, the estimated slope coefficients are slightly 
positive (less than unity) for most countries and pooled data. Therefore, they conclude that 
high equity returns currencies tend to depreciate against low equity returns currencies.  
However, equation (3.1) can be rewritten as 
                       
      
    
  
             
  
    
  
 ,  (3.1’) 
Due to the covariance term, we cannot express the UEP relation in a regression model. In 
addition to the above problem, testing the UIP or UEP relation using the UIP or UEP 
regression tells only whether the relations hold or not. When the relations do not hold, the 
testing does not intuitively give the magnitude of the deviation of the relation. Lastly, the 
UEP relation should hold ex-ante not ex-post because economic agents make their probability 
assessments based on the information available to them at the time. If ex-post data are used in 
the UEP regression, the error term is correlated with the regressor. 
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We propose solutions to the above problems as follows. We calculate the expected 
domestic equity return and expected foreign equity return directly and make a comparison. 
Since the expectation and economic system (data generating process) are not known, we 
assume that the data are generated according to the ad hoc VAR model. 
3.2.2 Estimation 
We propose an alternative method to test UEP. First, we define the ratio from the UEP 
relation as 
        
          
       
            
        (3.3) 
where,         is the UEP ratio.        
  
UEP holds if          . Second, we assume that economic agents behave as the 
VAR model. Therefore, data are generated by fitting the three-variable VAR model 
consisting of variables      
 , and   .  
Similarly, we define the ratio from the UIP condition as the ratio of foreign returns on the 
bond market and domestic returns on the bond market: 
       
     
          
        
,         (3.4) 
where,     is the UIP ratio. 
We also assume that the data are generated by fitting the three-variable VAR model 
consisting of variables      
  and   . 
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3.2.3 The Data Generating Processes 
To test the UEP relation, the VAR model is assumed as the data generating process. The 
simulations are run 500 times. The number of lags is determined by the Schwarz's Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC). 
Consider the VAR presentation: 
                                 ,      (3.5) 
where 
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The data and empirical distribution of         are created as follows: 
Step 1. Use the original data to get the coefficient estimates,    and   . 
Step 2. Draw    from multivariate normal distribution based on the estimated covariance 
matrix:           . 
Step 3. Generate new observations based on the assumed data generated process as 
follows: 
Fix the initial observation to the value of the original observed data up to the     period 
(  is the number of lags). 
Use the coefficient estimate,   , in step 1 to generate systematic part of     , then add    to 
get  
  
  
 
  
 . 
Step 4. Given    already drawn, draw additional   
 as explained in step 2 to generate 
additional     
           
  in each of the time period from period    . Repeat this step 
500 times. Then calculate 
 
   
     
       
     
    to obtain        
      . 
Step 5. Calculate each period UEP ratio:        
          
       
            
. Then average them 
over time. 
Step 6. To get the empirical distribution, Repeat Step 2, 3, 4, and 5 500 times. 
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In the same fashion, to test the UIP relation, the VAR representation (3.5) is also 
assumed, but     
  
  
 
  
 
   
instead. The data and empirical distribution of         are 
similarly created as follows: 
Step 1. Use the original data to get the coefficient estimates,    and   . 
Step 2. Draw    from multivariate normal distribution based on the estimated covariance 
matrix:           . 
Step 3. Generate new observations based on the assumed data generated process as follows: 
Fix the initial observation to the value of the original observed data up to the     period 
(  is the number of lags). 
Use the coefficient estimate,   , in step 1 to generate systematic part of     , then add   to 
get  
  
  
 
  
 . 
Step 4. Calculate each period UEP ratio:      
     
          
        
. Then average them over time. 
Step 5. To get the empirical distribution, Repeat Step 2, 3 and 4 500 times. 
Above we elaborated how we obtain the empirical distributions and calculate the UEP ratio 
and UIP ratio directly from the definitions. However, since most studies use the regression 
models to test the parities, we would like to see how the regressions perform in our alternative 
testing method. , we translate the regressions into the Ratios by calculating the UEP Ratio and 
UIP Ratio implied by the regressions as follows. 
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UEP Ratio implied by regression 
Consider the UEP regression: 
                            
        ,     (3.6) 
or                                   
   . 
             
          
       
            
, 
where,         is the UEP ratio. 
                              
                                           , 
where,                   
                     
                       
  
    
  
 . 
        
                 
                                                             , 
where,                                                
               
         
                           .              and       are the Jensen’s Inequality terms. 
                    
                                             . 
             
                                    
                      
     . 
                                  
                           .  (3.7) 
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Simulation Method 
Step 1. Use the original data to get the coefficient estimates,    and   . 
Step 2. Draw    from multivariate normal distribution based on the estimated covariance 
matrix:           . 
Step 3. Generate new observations based on the assumed data generated process as 
follows: 
Fix the initial observation to the value of the original observed data up to the     period 
(  is the number of lags). 
Use the coefficient estimate,   , in step 1 to generate systematic part of     , then add    to 
get 
  
  
 
  
 . 
Step 4. Run the UIP regression to estimate   . 
Step 5. Calculate each period UEP Ratio implied by regression:               
                   
   , the covariance term           , the Jensen’s Inequality terms 
           ,            , and            . Then average them over time. 
Step 6. To get the empirical distribution, Repeat Step 2, 3, 4, and 5 500 times. 
UIP Ratio implied by the regression 
Consider UIP regression: 
                  
       ,       (3.8) 
37 
 
or                        
  . 
      
     
          
        
,  
where     is the UIP Ratio. 
                   
                                 . 
          
                    , 
where the Jensen’s Inequality term                               . 
             
               
           . 
                         
        .     (3.9) 
Simulation Method 
Step 1. Use the original data to get the coefficient estimates,    and   . 
Step 2. Draw    from multivariate normal distribution based on the estimated covariance 
matrix:           . 
Step 3. Generate new observations based on the assumed data generated process as 
follows: 
Fix the initial observation to the value of the original observed data up to the     period 
(  is the number of lags). 
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Use the coefficient estimate,   , in step 1 to generate systematic part of     , then add    to 
get 
  
  
 
  
 . 
Step 4. Run the UIP regression to estimate   . 
Step 5. Calculate each period UEP deviation:                       
        . Then 
average them over time. 
Step 6. To get the empirical distribution, Repeat Steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 500 times. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Data 
The data in this empirical investigation are quarterly data on exchange rates and equity 
price index in nine countries with developed financial markets over the third quarter of 1997 
through the first quarter of 2007. The exchange rate in each country is the price of each 
currency in terms of US dollars.
13
 
3.3.2 UEP vs. UIP 
Table 3.1 shows the central tendency of the UIP Ratio, UEP Ratio, and their standard 
deviations. The central tendency of the UIP Ratio is just slightly different from unity for 
every country. For example, the central tendency of the UIP Ratio for Australia is 1.002 
indicating that the return from Australian (foreign) assets is just 0.2 percent higher than the 
                                                 
13
 The data on daily spot exchange rates are from the Datastream of the WM Company/Reuters, except the euro, 
which is from Barclay’s Bank International. The equity price index data are from the Datastream.  
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return from U.S. (home) assets. In other words, UIP holds better than we thought, given the 
negative coefficient estimate in the UIP regression or the UIP puzzle often found in the 
literature. In addition, it is surprising that the central tendency of the UIP Ratio is 
significantly less than the central tendency of the UEP Ratio for every country. So, we find 
that UIP holds better than UEP. This notion is opposite from the literature that mostly finds 
evidence supporting UEP not UIP. However, it is not clear whether the equity carry trade is 
riskier than the currency carry trade since, unlike others, the standard deviations of UIP Ratio 
for Denmark, New Zealand, and Switzerland are greater than those of UEP Ratio. 
Table 3.1: UIP Ratio and UEP Ratio 
Country 
UIPR 
(1) 
UIPR C.I. 
(2) 
UIPR Std 
(3) 
UEPR 
(4) 
UEPR C.I. 
(5) 
UEPR Std 
(6) 
Australia 1.002 (1.000, 1.004) 0.025 1.060 (1.056, 1.064) 0.046 
Canada 1.018 (1.013, 1.023) 0.055 1.122 (1.116, 1.129) 0.075 
Denmark 1.057 (1.049, 1.065) 0.091 1.156 (1.150, 1.161) 0.064 
Euro 1.008 (1.004, 1.012) 0.045 1.179 (1.173, 1.185) 0.067 
Japan 0.995 (0.993, 0.997) 0.023 1.034 (1.030, 1.038) 0.049 
New Zealand 1.017 (1.011, 1.023) 0.071 1.044 (1.040, 1.047) 0.040 
Norway 1.038 (1.032, 1.044) 0.067 1.156 (1.150, 1.162) 0.067 
Sweden 1.034 (1.028, 1.039) 0.061 1.194 (1.188, 1.200) 0.065 
Switzerland 1.036 (1.029, 1.042) 0.074 1.053 (1.050, 1.056) 0.037 
United Kingdom 0.987 (0.984, 0.990) 0.038 1.105 (1.101, 1.109) 0.045 
Note: 1. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean of the UIP Ratio and its 95% confidence interval. 
2. Column 3 shows the standard deviation of the UIP Ratio. 
3. Columns 4 and 5 show the mean of the UEP Ratio and its 95% confidence interval. 
4. Column 6 shows the standard deviation of the UEP Ratio 
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Why do we find such contrasting results from the literature? Most researchers employ the 
UIP regression to test the UIP relation and the UEP regression to test the UEP relation. 
However, when the relations do not hold, the testing does not intuitively give the magnitude 
of the deviation of the relations. So, one of the benefits of using the UIP Ratio and UEP Ratio 
is that this testing can tell the degree of the deviation from the parities. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the empirical distributions of the UIP Ratio and UEP Ratio 
corresponding to the results in Table 3.1. Most empirical distributions are normally 
distributed except those of the UIP Ratio for Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland 
which are bimodally distributed. For these countries, their interest rates fluctuate around U.S. 
interest rate, so the returns of currency carry trade alternate between positive and negative. 
Since most of the literature relies on the regression methods to test the parities, we are 
interested to compare and contrast the UIP Ratio and UIP Ratio implied by the regressions 
from the Ratios calculated directly from the definitions. Table 3.2 shows the central tendency 
of the UIP Ratio, UIP Ratio implied by the regression, and the Jensen’s Inequality term. It is 
clear that the central tendencies of the UIP Ratio and UIP Ratio implied by the regression are 
similar. Regarding the Jensen’s Inequality term which is always left out from the regression, 
the central tendency of its exponential is near unity. In other words, the Jensen’s Inequality 
term is close to zero for each country. So we have the impression that the UIP regression can 
be an unbiased predictor of the UIP relation.  
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Table 3.2: UIP Ratio Implied by the Regression 
Country 
UIPR 
(1) 
UIPR C.I. 
(2) 
UIPR by 
regress 
(3) 
UIPR by 
regress C.I. 
(4) 
       
(5) 
       C.I. 
(6) 
Australia 1.002 (1.000, 1.004) 0.996 (0.994, 0.998) 1.006 (1.005, 1.006) 
Canada 1.018 (1.013, 1.023) 1.015 (1.010, 1.020) 1.003 (1.003, 1.004) 
Denmark 1.057 (1.049, 1.065) 1.049 (1.041, 1.057) 1.007 (1.007, 1.008) 
Euro 1.008 (1.004, 1.012) 1.002 (0.998, 1.006) 1.007 (1.006, 1.007) 
Japan 0.995 (0.993, 0.997) 0.992 (0.990, 0.994) 1.004 (1.003, 1.004) 
New Zealand 1.017 (1.011, 1.023) 1.001 (0.996, 1.006) 1.013 (1.013, 1.014) 
Norway 1.038 (1.032, 1.044) 1.031 (1.026, 1.037) 1.006 (1.006, 1.007) 
Sweden 1.034 (1.028, 1.039) 1.027 (1.021, 1.032) 1.007 (1.006, 1.007) 
Switzerland 1.036 (1.029, 1.042) 1.029 (1.023, 1.036) 1.006 (1.006, 1.007) 
United Kingdom 0.987 (0.984, 0.990) 0.985 (0.982, 0.989) 1.002 (1.001, 1.002) 
Note: 1. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean of the UIP Ratio calculated directly from the definition and its 95% 
confidence interval. 
2. Columns 2 and 3 show the mean of the UIP Ratio implied by the regression and its 95% confidence 
interval. 
3. Columns 5 and 6 show the central tendency of exponential of the Jensen’s Inequality term and its 
95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure A3.2 illustrates the empirical distribution of the UIP Ratio implied by the 
regressions and exponential of the Jensen’s Inequality Term corresponding to results in Table 
3.2. Most empirical distributions are normally distributed except those of the UIP Ratio for 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland which are bimodally distributed. For these 
countries, their interest rates fluctuate around the U.S. interest rate, so the returns of currency 
carry trade alternate between positive and negative. 
Similarly, we contrast the UEP Ratio and UEP Ratio implied by the regressions from the 
Ratios calculated directly from the definitions. Table 3.3 shows the central tendency of the 
UEP Ratio, UEP Ratio implied by the regression, the covariance of foreign equity return and 
exchange rate, and the Jensen’s Inequality terms. By comparing columns 1 and 3, we find 
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that the UEP Ratio implied by the regression is significantly less than the UEP Ratio 
calculated directly from the definition. This suggests that the UEP regression is a bias 
predictor of the UEP relation. In order to investigate where the bias is from, we calculate the 
terms that are usually left out from the regression: the covariance of foreign equity return and 
exchange rate, and the Jensen’s Inequality terms. Columns 5, 7, 9 and 11 show the central 
tendency of the exponential of the covariance term and Jensen’s Inequality terms, 
respectively. We find that the covariance term is far from zero (its exponential is far from 
unity). However, the Jensen’s Inequality terms are relatively small and close to zero. Now we 
have the impression that the bias from the UEP regression comes from the ignorance of the 
covariance term. The positive covariance term suggests that when the foreign equity return 
increases, demand of the foreign currency rises making the foreign currency appreciate. This 
is why the expected foreign equity return is greater than the expected domestic equity return 
in our model. 
Figure A3.3 shows empirical distributions of the UEP Ratio implied by the regression, 
exponentials of the covariance term and the Jensen’s Inequality terms. All empirical 
distributions are normally distributed. 
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Table 3.3: UEP Ratio Implied by the Regression 
Country UEPR 
 
 
(1) 
UEPR C.I. 
 
 
(2) 
UEPR by 
regress 
 
(3) 
UEPR by 
regress C.I. 
 
(4) 
       
 
 
(5) 
        C.I. 
 
 
(6) 
Australia 1.060 (1.056, 1.064) 1.012 (1.007, 1.017) 1.046 (1.044, 1.047) 
Canada 1.122 (1.116, 1.129) 1.029 (1.022, 1.036) 1.089 (1.086, 1.091) 
Denmark 1.156 (1.150, 1.161) 1.043 (1.036, 1.051) 1.107 (1.103, 1.111) 
Euro 1.179 (1.173, 1.185) 1.043 (1.036, 1.051) 1.134 (1.129, 1.140) 
Japan 1.034 (1.030, 1.038) 1.013 (1.008, 1.017) 1.020 (1.019, 1.022) 
New Zealand 1.044 (1.040, 1.047) 1.028 (1.024, 1.033) 1.012 (1.011, 1.013) 
Norway 1.156 (1.150, 1.162) 1.039 (1.032, 1.046) 1.111 (1.107, 1.115) 
Sweden 1.194 (1.188, 1.200) 1.041 (1.035, 1.048) 1.147 (1.141, 1.152) 
Switzerland 1.053 (1.050, 1.056) 1.001 (0.996, 1.006) 1.053 (1.050, 1.055) 
United 
Kingdom 
1.105 (1.101, 1.109) 1.008 (1.003, 1.013) 1.097 (1.094, 1.101) 
 
Table 3.3: UEP Ratio Implied by the Regression (Continued)  
Country         
 
 
(7) 
exp     C.I. 
 
 
(8) 
        
 
 
(9) 
       C.I. 
 
 
(10) 
        
 
 
(11) 
        C.I. 
 
 
(12) 
Australia 1.010 (1.009, 1.011) 1.004 (1.003, 1.005) 1.010 (1.008, 1.011) 
Canada 0.996 (0.995, 0.997) 1.014 (1.012, 1.016) 1.007 (1.006, 1.009) 
Denmark 0.998 (0.997, 0.999) 1.019 (1.016, 1.021) 1.013 (1.011, 1.015) 
Euro 0.978 (0.976, 0.980) 1.033 (1.030, 1.037) 1.010 (1.008, 1.012) 
Japan 0.997 (0.996, 0.999) 1.010 (1.009, 1.012) 1.003 (1.002, 1.004) 
New Zealand 1.006 (1.005, 1.006) 1.002 (1.001, 1.002) 1.004 (1.003, 1.005) 
Norway 0.984 (0.982, 0.985) 1.028 (1.025, 1.031) 1.008 (1.007, 1.010) 
Sweden 0.964 (0.962, 0.967) 1.050 (1.046, 1.053) 1.014 (1.012, 1.015) 
Switzerland 1.001 (1.000, 1.002) 1.008 (1.006, 1.010) 1.007 (1.006, 1.009) 
United 
Kingdom 
0.999 (0.999, 1.000) 1.020 (1.018, 1.023) 1.017 (1.015, 1.020) 
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Note:  1. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean of the UEP Ratio calculated directly from the definition and its 
95% confidence interval. 
2. Columns 2 and 3 show the mean of the UEP Ratio implied by the regression and its 95% confidence 
interval. 
3. Columns 5 and 6 show the central tendency of exponential of                   
        
             
            and its 95% confidence interval. 
4. Columns 7 and 8 show the central tendency of exponential of the Jensen’s Inequality term       
                        and its 95% confidence interval. 
5. Columns 9 and 10 show the central tendency of exponential of the Jensen’s Inequality term      
            
               
   and its 95% confidence interval. 
6. Columns 11 and 12 show the central tendency of exponential of the Jensen’s Inequality term 
                                  and its 95% confidence interval. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The UIP regression has long been used to test the UIP relation. Recently, Hau and Rey 
(2006), Cappiello and De Santis (2005), and Kim (2011) modify the UIP regression to 
replace the returns from risk-free assets such as T-bills with the expected returns from risky 
assets such as equity. It is called the UEP regression, and it has been used to test the UEP 
relation, an arbitrage condition in equity markets. In this paper, we find problems with the 
regression method used to test the existence of the parities. First, the regression method does 
not intuitively give the magnitude of deviation when the UIP or UEP relation does not hold. 
In addition, the UEP relation should be hold ex-ante not ex-post. However, the expected 
equity returns are not known ex ante. If ex-post data are used in the UEP regression [as done 
by Hau and Rey (2006), Cappiello and De Santis (2005), and Kim (2011)], the regression is 
not valid  
Due to the shortcomings of the regression method, we propose an alternative method to 
test the UIP relation and UEP relation called the UIP Ratio and UEP Ratio, respectively, by 
the simulation technique. We come up with four main findings. First, UIP is less puzzling 
than we thought since the UIP regression does not intuitively give the magnitude of the 
deviation in UIP. Second, unlike the literature, we find that UIP holds better than UEP. Third, 
the UEP regression is a bias predictor of the deviation in UEP because the covariance of 
foreign equity return and exchange rate is left out. Finally, the expected foreign equity return 
is greater than the expected domestic equity return in our model. The reason is that 
         
        is positive (        . When the foreign equity return increases, demand 
for the foreign currency rises making the foreign currency appreciate. 
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Chapter 4 
Summary 
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) is a no-arbitrage condition in the asset market where 
trades are instantaneous and virtually frictionless. UIP explains an equilibrium in which a 
speculator is indifferent between interest bearing identical assets denominated in different 
currency. UIP predicts that a high interest currency tends to depreciate against a low interest 
rate currency by the same percentage point as the interest rate differential between the two 
countries. Empirically, when the exchange rate change is regressed on the interest rate 
differential the null hypothesis that the slope coefficient is unity should not be rejected. 
It is important to emphasize that empirically, the exchange rate change can be predicted 
by not only the interest rate differential but also the inflation differential via the relative PPP 
relation. Relative PPP is an equilibrium in the goods market. Relative PPP predicts that a 
high-inflation currency tends to depreciate against a low-inflation currency. To test relative 
PPP, the exchange rate change is regressed on the inflation differential. Therefore, it is 
crucial to distinguish whether the exchange rate change is due to the asset market (UIP 
relation) or goods market (relative PPP relation). 
It has long been known that the uncovered interest parity (UIP) relation rarely holds 
empirically. Most studies use the data from developed economies and find that the UIP slope 
coefficient is often not only less than unity but also negative. However, when data from 
emerging economies are used, the UIP slope coefficient is not negative (though still far from 
unity). In other worlds, according to these findings, the UIP relation is less puzzling for 
emerging economies. In this dissertation, we attempt to answer the following question: are 
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the economies of developing countries different from those of developed countries in the 
context of the UIP condition? 
In Chapter 2, we find that low inflation countries (most are developed countries) and high 
inflation countries (all are developing countries) are different in context of nominal UIP. That 
is, the “nominal UIP puzzle” is less prevalent in high inflation countries than in low inflation 
countries. However, regarding the real UIP relation, the two groups of countries are similar. 
Specifically, the low inflation countries have the same degree of “real UIP puzzle” as the 
high inflation countries. This is the broad contribution of Chapter 2. We argue that the 
exchange rate change in high-inflation countries is due to the relative PPP relation, not the 
UIP relation as in low-inflation countries. It appears that the inflation plays a role of a noise 
in rather than a key to unlock the puzzle underlying the UIP relation. If this is the case, future 
research should focus on the real UIP relation. In addition, more research should investigate 
and explain the “real UIP puzzle.” 
With increases in financial globalization, investors hold foreign risk-free assets or bonds 
as well as risky-assets such as equities. The increasing portion of international equity flows 
and the notorious empirical failure of UIP are motivations to explore an alternative no-
arbitrage condition in which, instead of interest rate differential, expected equity return 
differential between two countries is equal to expected change in exchange rate, called the 
“uncovered equity parity” (UEP) condition. UEP states that when expected foreign equity 
return is higher than the expected U.S. equity return, rational and risk-neutral U.S. investors 
should expect the foreign currency to depreciate against the dollar by the difference between 
the two expected returns. In the literature, UEP is largely supported by data in the sense that 
equity return differential predicts exchange rate movement in the right direction. This 
suggests that UEP holds better than UIP. 
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In Chapter 3, we find problems with the regression method used to test the UIP or UEP 
relation. First, the regression method does not intuitively give the magnitude of deviation 
when the UIP or UEP relation does not hold. In addition, the UEP relation should be hold ex-
ante not ex-post. However, the expected equity returns are not known ex ante. We propose an 
alternative method to test UIP and UEP. This is the broad contribution of Chapter 3. Our 
method intuitively gives the magnitude of the deviation from the parities. With shortcomings 
of conventional UIP and UEP testing using the regressions, we find that UIP actually holds 
better than UEP. Furthermore, we find that the UEP regression is a bias predictor of the 
deviation in UEP because the covariance of foreign equity return and exchange rate is left 
out. In future research, we should investigate why the arbitrage in the assets market via UIP 
holds better than the arbitrage in the equity markets via UEP. 
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Appendix 
Table A 2.1: Country Information 
ID Country 
Start 
Date 
End 
Date 
Inflation 
Group 
Interest Rate 
Source 
Unemployment Rate 
Source 
1 Argentina 1997q4 2009q1 H DS  - 
2 Australia 1997q3 2009q1 L DS  OECD 
3 Austria 1994q1 1998q4 L DS OECD 
4 Belgium 1994q1 1998q4 L DS  OECD 
5 Brazil 2000q1 2009q1 H GFD OECD 
6 Canada 1994q1 2009q1 L DS OECD 
7 Colombia 2001q3 2008q1 H GFD IMF 
8 Croatia 1997q4 2006q2 H DS  - 
9 Czech Republic 1995q2 2009q1 H DS OECD 
10 Denmark 1994q1 2009q1 L DS  - 
11 Eurozone 1999q2 2009q1 L DS OECD 
12 Finland 1994q1 1998q4 L DS OECD 
13 France 1994q1 1998q4 L DS OECD 
14 Germany 1994q1 1998q4 L DS OECD 
15 Greece 1994q4 2000q4 H DS  - 
16 Hong Kong 1997q3 2009q1 L DS IMF 
17 Hungary 1996q1 2009q1 H DS OECD 
18 Iceland 1998q4 2007q4 H DS  - 
19 India 1999q3 2009q1 H DS  - 
20 Indonesia 1997q3 2009q1 H GFD  - 
21 Ireland 1994q1 1998q4 L DS OECD 
22 Italy 1994q1 1998q4 L DS OECD 
23 Japan 1994q1 2009q1 L DS OECD 
24 Mexico 2001q4 2009q1 H DS OECD 
25 Netherlands 1994q1 1998q4 L DS  - 
26 New Zealand 1997q3 2009q1 L DS OECD 
27 Norway 1994q1 2009q1 L DS OECD 
28 Pakistan 1994q2 2009q1 H DS  - 
29 Philippines 1999q4 2006q3 H DS IMF 
30 Poland 1994q2 2009q1 H DS OECD 
31 Portugal 1994q1 1998q4 L DS IMF 
32 Romania 1997q3 2009q1 H DS  - 
33 Russia 1996q3 2009q1 H DS  - 
34 Singapore 1994q1 2009q1 L DS  - 
35 Slovakia 1997q3 2008q4 H DS OECD 
36 South Africa 1997q3 2009q1 H DS  - 
37 Spain 1994q1 1998q4 L DS OECD 
38 Sweden 1997q3 2009q1 L DS OECD 
39 Switzerland 1994q1 2009q1 L BBA OECD 
40 Thailand 1997q3 2006q3 H DS  - 
41 Turkey 2003q1 2009q1 H DS OECD 
42 United Kingdom 1994q1 2009q1 L DS OECD 
Note:  L and H indicate low and high inflation countries, respectively. DS, GFD and BBA stand for the 
Datastream, the Global Financial Data and the British Bankers’ Association, respectively. IMF data 
was obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics CD released for 
June 2009. OECD data was retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
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Table A 2.2: Nominal UIP Regressions (1997Q3-2009Q1) 
  
Low 
Inflation 
High Inflation Low Inflation High Inflation  
 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 ∆st+1  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  
A. Fixed Effects Regression      
     
  -1.549** 0.403* -1.569** -0.200 
  (0.333) (0.192) (0.323) (0.392) 
      
      
    
       
     0.096 0.847**  
    (0.414) (0.283)  
   0.014 0.019 0.014 0.059  
N 617 846 855 855  
      
B. Hypothesis Testing      
Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value    
     7.66** 0.000    
     3.10** 0.001    
      5.08** 0.000    
        2.70** 0.001    
Notes: 1. Nominal UIP is given in regression (2):                     
        ; and the augmented UIP 
is given in regression (2.8):                      
            
       
          , where i =   for 
low inflation countries and i =  for high inflation countries. 
2. The hypothesis testing is performed using the two-tailed test. 
3. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for regression (2.3) and are Bootstrapped standard 
errors to account for the generated regrssor in regression (2.5). * indicates significance at 5-percent 
level. ** indicates significance at 1-percent level. 
 
Table A 2.3: Relative PPP Regressions (1997Q3-2009Q1) 
  Low Inflation High Inflation 
 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
    
       
    -0.039 0.703** 
  (0.381) (0.097) 
    0.000 0.056 
N  617 781 
Notes: 1. Relative PPP is given in regression (2.15). 
2. Numbers in parentheses are Bootstrapped standard errors. * indicates significance at 5-percent level. 
** indicates significance at 1-percent level. 
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Table A 2.4: Real UIP Regressions (1997Q3-2009Q1) 
Notes: 1. Real UIP regression is given in regression (2.10):                     
        , i =   for low 
inflation countries and i =  for high inflation countries. 
2. The hypothesis testing is performed using the two-tailed test. 
3. Numbers in parentheses are Bootstrapped standard errors to account for the generated regressors. ** 
indicates significance at 1-percent level. 
 
 
Table A 2.5: Nominal UIP Regressions-Extreme Inflation Cutoffs 
  
Low 
Inflation 
High Inflation Low Inflation High Inflation  
 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 ∆st+1  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  
A. Fixed Effects Regression      
     
  -2.224** 0.383* -2.118** -0.074 
  (0.302) (0.167) (0.249) (0.350) 
      
      
    
       
     -0.145 0.750**  
    (0.323) (0.260)  
   0.035 0.028 0.038 0.072  
N 417 450 417 450  
      
B. Hypothesis Testing      
Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value    
     10.69** 0.000    
     3.69** 0.003    
      7.56** 0.000    
        4.76** 0.000    
Notes: 1. Nominal UIP is given in regression (2.2):                     
        ;  the augmented UIP 
is given in regression (2.8):                      
            
       
          , where i =   for 
low inflation countries and i =  for high inflation countries. 
2. The hypothesis testing is performed using the two-tailed test. 
3. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for regression (2.2) and are Bootstrapped standard 
errors to account for the generated regrssor in regression (2.8). * indicates significance at 5-percent 
level. ** indicates significance at 1-percent level. 
 
 
 
  
  Low Inflation High Inflation 
 ∆qt+1 ∆qt+1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
A. Fixed Effects Regression    
     
   0.258 -0.026 
  (0.367) (0.307) 
    
    0.001 0.000 
N  617 781 
    
B. Hypothesis Testing    
Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value  
     2.02* 0.043  
     3.35** 0.001  
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Table A 2.6: Relative PPP Regressions-Extreme Inflation Cutoffs 
  Low Inflation High Inflation 
 ∆st+1 ∆st+1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
    
       
    -0.619 0.692** 
  (0.321) (0.111) 
    0.007 0.071 
N  397 450 
Notes: 1. Relative PPP is given in regression (2.5). 
2. Numbers in parentheses are Bootstrapped standard errors. * indicates significance at 5-percent level. 
** indicates significance at 1-percent level. 
3. Low Inflation is lower than the 1
st
 quartile; High Inflation is greater than the 3
rd
 quartile. 
 
 
Table A 2.7: Real UIP Regressions-Extreme Inflation Cutoffs 
Notes: 1. Real UIP regression is given in regression (2.10):                     
        , i =   for low 
inflation countries and i =  for high inflation countries. 
2. The hypothesis testing is performed using the two-tailed test. 
3. Numbers in parentheses are Bootstrapped standard errors to account for the generated regressors. ** 
indicates significance at 1-percent level. 
4. Low Inflation is lower than the 1
st
 quartile; High Inflation is greater than the 3
rd
 quartile. 
 
 
 
 
  
  Low Inflation High Inflation 
 ∆qt+1 ∆qt+1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
A. Fixed Effects Regression    
     
   0.574 0.019 
  (0.271) (0.286) 
    
    0.007 0.000 
N  397 450 
    
B. Hypothesis Testing    
Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value  
     1.57 0.117  
     3.43** 0.001  
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Figure A3.1: Distribution of the UIP Ratio (left) and UEP Ratio (right) 
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Figure A3.2: Empirical Distribution of the UIP Ratio implied by the regressions (left) 
and exponential of the Jensen’s Inequality Term (right) 
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Figure A3.3: Empirical Distributions of the UEP Ratio implied by the regression, 
exponential of the covariance term, and exponential of the Jensen’s Inequality terms 
A. Australia 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 65 
B. Canada 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 66 
C. Denmark 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 67 
D. Euro 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 68 
E. Japan 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 69 
F. New Zealand 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 70 
G. Norway 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 71 
H. Sweden 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 72 
I. Switzerland 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 73 
J. United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
